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TAKING POLITICAL SCIENCE SERIOUSLY 
H.W. PERRY, JR.* 
One can tell that Professor Merrill spent time in the Office of the Solicitor 
General.  His Childress Lecture1 resembles a product from the S.G.’s Office: it 
is intelligent, thorough, careful, and nuanced.  It provides guidance on how to 
think about an issue, but, importantly and refreshingly, it also acknowledges its 
limitations and is willing to confess error.  There is no hiding the ball.  Few 
other institutions or scholars do that so forthrightly.  There are many things 
about his lecture to praise.  For example, his argument to show why a simple 
liberal/conservative distinction does a poor job of capturing differences 
between Justices, notably Justice Thomas and Justice White, is excellent.  
Others have criticized a liberal/conservative categorization as too simplistic, 
especially when critiquing political science scholarship, but they often merely 
assert the claim.  Here, Professor Merrill systematically demonstrates why this 
is so.  Relatedly, he treats the Justices differently, showing that they vary on 
many dimensions in terms of their multi-faceted goals and behaviors.  Again, 
one might think such a notion obvious, and yet much analysis of the Court, 
especially by political scientists, often tends to differentiate Justices simply by 
their preference for outcomes.  Additionally, his analysis of Justice Scalia on 
federalism is provocative and probative, and changes the terms of the debate 
about Justice Scalia.  Similarly, his general notion of a Court being in stasis or 
in flux is a very helpful way to think about this Court in particular, as well as a 
promising way to think about future Courts.  Much more could be praised.  
The role of commentator, however, is usually best fulfilled by raising questions 
and criticisms.  That this Essay is so focused should not be misinterpreted.  My 
overall opinion is that the lecture is a tour de force.  Unlike Professor Merrill’s 
careful argument, however, I shall luxuriate in the role of commentator and 
oversimplify, cite sparingly, make broad characterizations, and offer 
suggestions that are really beyond the scope of his Lecture, with the goal of 
highlighting the small bit of corrective that I think is needed for the argument.2 
 
* Associate Professor of Government and Law, The University of Texas at Austin. 
 1. Thomas W. Merrill, The Making of the Second Rehnquist Court: A Preliminary Analysis, 
47 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 569 (2003). 
 2. I ask, in advance, for a blanket pardon as I proceed to characterize scholarship, 
disciplines, trends, and the like with a broad brush while making little effort at documenting my 
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As a professor of both political science and law, I spend much of my time 
urging my colleagues in one discipline to take more seriously the work in the 
other discipline.  My reaction, then, to Professor Merrill’s earnest attempt to 
take political science seriously led me to a somewhat ironic reaction: do not 
take us quite that seriously.3  More precisely, be selective in what one imports 
and “learns” from political science, including the fact that public law 
scholarship in political science might not be the best source for insight or 
represent the best of political science.4  Apart from that caveat, it is a joy to see 
a law professor engage the discipline of political science in a serious way.  
Political scientists are often aghast at the willingness of legal scholars to ignore 
(or to be content with a superficial knowledge of) scholarship from other 
areas.5  For example, one of the criticisms of critical legal studies by political 
scientists was not so much the general premises, but rather the superficiality of 
some of the scholarship.6  “Doing” philosophy or serious Marxist analysis 
requires more than simply being smart and having a passing familiarity with 
 
position, let alone carefully noting exceptions or drawing distinctions.  My purpose here is, in 
fact, to make and report broad characterizations. 
 3. For this essay, I wear my political science hat. 
 4. Perhaps a better way of saying it is that while I believe scholarship in the law can benefit 
greatly from what political scientists know, one would not want to limit oneself to public law 
scholarship as the only or best source of insights from political science.  Additionally, what 
political scientists “know” is often a subject of much contention. 
 5. Elsewhere I have taken political scientists to task for ignoring and trivializing what it is 
law professors, judges, and legal practitioners know.  See, e.g., H.W. PERRY, JR., DECIDING TO 
DECIDE: AGENDA SETTING IN THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT (1991).  That said, I think 
that most political scientists who study law and legal institutions are far more familiar with the 
legal literature than many law professors and judges are with the relevant social science literature.  
Moreover, I would assert that political scientists (or historians or sociologists) are less likely to 
assume that with a little bit of reading in an area that they are then competent to hold forth.  There 
are, of course, many notable exceptions on both sides.  Some of the best political science done on 
law is done by law professors, and some of the best legal analysis is done by political scientists.  
To name a couple of examples, political scientist Edward S. Corwin had a few important things to 
say about constitutional law.  See, e.g., 1 CORWIN ON THE CONSTITUTION: THE FOUNDATIONS OF 
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL AND POLITICAL THOUGHT, THE POWERS OF CONGRESS, AND THE 
PRESIDENT’S POWER OF REMOVAL (Richard Loss ed., 1981); 2 CORWIN ON THE CONSTITUTION: 
THE JUDICIARY (Richard Loss ed., 1987); 3 CORWIN ON THE CONSTITUTION: ON LIBERTY 
AGAINST GOVERNMENT (Richard Loss ed., 1988).  Conversely, legal scholar Lucas A. Powe 
examined the Warren Court in a broad political context that is rarely seen these days in political 
science.  See LUCAS A. POWE, JR., THE WARREN COURT AND AMERICAN POLITICS (2000).  
Powe’s book received special notice from the public law section of the American Political 
Science Association as one of the best books published in public law. 
 6. Criticism came on many fronts, but it usually took the form of what is interesting is not 
new.  For trenchant commentaries, see Sanford Levinson, On Critical Legal Studies, 1989 
DISSENT 360; Rogers M. Smith, After Criticism: An Analysis of the Critical Legal Studies 
Movement, in JUDGING THE CONSTITUTION: CRITICAL ESSAYS ON JUDICIAL LAWMAKING 92 
(Michael W. McCann & Gerald L. Houseman eds., 1989). 
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major writings.  Another example is less esoteric.  Legal academics and judges 
opine about the presidency, separation of powers, federalism, representation, 
and the like with little reference to generations of scholarship on such topics, 
much of which demonstrates conclusively that things simply do not work, or 
could not work, in the way that is being portrayed.  Perhaps one area where the 
legal academy itself came to realize that legal training, legal reasoning, 
intelligence, and familiarity with the American regime were not sufficient to 
the task was in the initial forays of constitution building in new or emerging 
democracies.7  The importance of such things as electoral structures, political 
parties, clientelism, civic culture, history, and ethnic and social cleavages, to 
outcomes—“Poly Sci. 101” for comparative political scientists—was often 
ignored, but, unfortunately, not with impunity.  Later waves of constitution 
building that took more seriously the knowledge and expertise of political 
scientists in comparative politics were certainly more productive. 
These general observations, however, are not apposite to the work of 
Professor Merrill.  One wishes that all of one’s political science students had as 
deep a knowledge and understanding of public law scholarship in political 
science as Professor Merrill does.  Not only did he take public law scholarship 
seriously, but also he clearly understood it, employed it fairly, and has 
improved and advanced it.  Nevertheless, Professor Merrill may have a bit too 
much enthusiasm for some of our theories and paradigms and perhaps may not 
fully appreciate how much contention, and, in some cases, disdain, surrounds 
some of our best known theories and models. 
Professor Merrill first turns his attention to the attitudinal model in public 
law scholarship, which he refers to as “[t]he dominant hypothesis of the 
political scientists.”8  He applies it fairly to the Rehnquist Court, and he is 
persuasive in demonstrating its inability to explain the phenomena he has 
observed.  Yet many (I dare say most) public law political scientists, let alone 
political scientists generally, have never taken the attitudinal model that 
seriously.  That is not to say that we do not take the attitudes and preferences 
of Justices seriously, or that we do not take seriously the work of the 
proponents of the attitudinal model.  Indeed, most political scientists would 
start from the point that any decision maker’s preferred outcome would play an 
important role in any decision process.  Most political scientists, however, 
would not believe that attitudes are the sole determinant, or that they play as 
singular a role as propounded by the so-called “attitudinal model.”9  It is true 
 
 7. See VICKI C. JACKSON & MARK TUSHNET, COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 
(1999); Bruce Ackerman, The New Separation of Powers, 113 HARV. L. REV. 633 (2000). 
 8. Merrill, supra note 1, at 590. 
 9. The number of essays and papers on this topic are numerous.  See, e.g., SUPREME COURT 
DECISION-MAKING: NEW INSTITUTIONALIST APPROACHES (Cornell W. Clayton & Howard 
Gillman eds., 1999). 
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that the attitudinal model has dominated much of the debate in the professional 
journals.  That is, however, in part, a function of how peer reviewed journals 
work.10  It is also because the proponents of attitudinal explanations have done 
rigorous quantitative work, which is what is most valued in the most 
prestigious political science journals, and quantitative work generally seeks 
refutation by more quantitative work.  Generally speaking, the most vociferous 
opposition to the attitudinal model has come from non-quantitative political 
scientists.  Therefore, one should not conclude that the model’s dominance in 
some journals makes it the dominant paradigm of public law political 
scientists.  Nevertheless, as previously stated, most political scientists, 
quantitative or not, would accept that attitudes matter greatly.  For at least half 
a century, we have demonstrated the malleability of the law and have assumed 
that the law is often manipulated to achieve outcomes that will reflect attitudes 
or preferences.11  Moreover, most would not believe that differences in 
outcomes can be explained solely by different philosophies of judicial 
interpretation, even though there is often a correlation.  Legal scholars would 
probably not disagree that attitudes matter, but I think it is fair to say that the 
centers of gravity are in different places.  Political scientists and lawyers 
generally do part company when it comes to the degree that law matters, or, 
more precisely, that preferences matter vis-à-vis the constraining nature of the 
law and judging.12  Still, most political scientists would see decision processes 
as more complex than the attitudinal model suggests.  Most political scientists 
understand that decision making involves multiple and often contradictory 
 
 10. The differences between the law review world and the peer reviewed journal world are 
dramatic.  There are only a handful of top professional journals in political science, and there is a 
strong pecking order among the handful.  The rejection rates of the top journals are often well 
over 90%.  Professional journals often reflect (enforce) a particular worldview or a 
methodological bias.  Depending upon one’s view, of course, that worldview is often seen as 
either the cutting edge of the discipline, the well-reflected views of the mainstream of the 
discipline, or an entrenched paradigm.  One can debate the advantages and disadvantages of peer 
reviewed journals.  Legal academics, however, must be aware of the jokes and derision aimed at 
the legal academy by other disciplines because the primary publishing venue is not peer reviewed.  
On the other hand, the multitude of good law reviews increases the likelihood that ideas of all 
sorts will get out and that they will be tested in a broader court of academic opinion.  This may be 
especially important for ideas, paradigms, and methodologies that are not currently in vogue.  
There are pros and cons to both worlds. 
 11. See infra notes 17-19 and accompanying text (discussing Robert McCloskey’s 
description of Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803)).  No attitudinalist, McCloskey, 
nonetheless saw Marshall’s preferences driving the result.  Much of the behavioral work of the 
1950s–1980s, as well as normative works, assumed the importance of attitudes at some level. 
 12. This is certainly reinforced by the different training one gets for a J.D. as opposed to a 
Ph.D. 
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beliefs and behaviors.13  For example, many of us would accept that judges, 
like any decision maker, are products of their own socialization.  That 
socialization would usually see an attitudinal model of decision making as 
inappropriate.  Indeed, one of the most frequently cited admonitions comes 
from one of the early public law behavioralists, C. Herman Pritchett, whose 
work spawned much subsequent public law behavioral scholarship.  He 
argued: 
  Again, political scientists who have done so much to put the “political” in 
“political jurisprudence” need to emphasize that it is still “jurisprudence.”  It is 
judging in a political context, but it is still judging; and judging is something 
different from legislating or administering.  Judges make choices, but they are 
not the “free” choices of congressmen. . . . Any accurate analysis of judicial 
behavior must have as a major purpose a full clarification of the unique 
limiting conditions under which judicial policy making proceeds.14 
Whether or not the attitudinal model is the “dominant hypothesis” of 
political science as Professor Merrill suggests, he is correct to note that it has 
structured much debate, and he would have been remiss not to have addressed 
the role of attitudes in explaining the Justices’ behavior.  Interestingly, his 
analysis and conclusions would probably comport with what most political 
scientists would believe, notwithstanding the impression that one might get 
from reading the American Political Science Review. 
Professor Merrill next turns to another area of public law political science: 
strategic decision making.  Before examining his argument, however, an 
observation that distinguishes between the attitudinal model and the strategic 
model is in order.  The former is idiosyncratic to the public law subfield in 
political science.  Its purpose, after all, is to debunk legal models of decision 
making.  To my knowledge, it has had no influence in other areas of political 
science.15  Strategic models of decision making, however, are part of a major 
 
 13. See JOHN W. KINGDON, CONGRESSMEN’S VOTING DECISIONS (2d ed. 1981); PERRY, 
supra note 5, at 271-284; JUDITH N. SHKLAR, LEGALISM: LAW, MORALS AND POLITICAL TRIALS, 
at x (1964). 
 14. C. Herman Pritchett, The Development of Judicial Research, in FRONTIERS OF JUDICIAL 
RESEARCH 42 (Joel B. Grossman & Joseph Tanenhaus eds., 1969).  Professor Merrill notes the 
Pritchett warning, but his own analysis does not take it or the constraining nature of the law as 
seriously as do many in political science. 
 15. In fact, to wash a little dirty laundry in public, a continual frustration of public law 
scholars generally is how much their work is ignored by the larger discipline of political science.  
Most political scientists know the work on other institutions and draw from it.  Whether or not 
this one way street is justified, it is fair to say that the best work on how members of Congress, or 
Presidents, or foreign regimes, or military opponents make decisions is richer and far more 
multifaceted.  See, e.g., ROBERT JERVIS, THE LOGIC OF IMAGES IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 
(1970); KINGDON, supra note 13; RICHARD E. NEUSTADT, PRESIDENTIAL POWER: THE POLITICS 
OF LEADERSHIP (1960); MARK A. PETERSON, LEGISLATING TOGETHER: THE WHITE HOUSE AND 
CAPITOL HILL FROM EISENHOWER TO REAGAN (1990). 
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intellectual movement in political science and other social sciences generally, a 
point to which I shall return. 
Do Justices act strategically?  Of course.  Are they influenced by both 
internal and external actors?  Undoubtedly.  This is accepted even by the most 
traditional understandings of judicial decision making short of mechanical 
jurisprudence, and it did not take political scientists to introduce the idea of 
strategy into judicial decision making.  Justices are expected to try to write 
opinions that will encourage others to join them, while other Justices know 
how to hold out.  That is strategy.  Strategic models are not new, though they 
have found a new resurgence given the rise of rational choice in political 
science generally in the 1980s.  However, it took it awhile to make it to the 
public law subfield.  The key word is resurgence.  Strategic understandings of 
judicial behavior in political science actually predate the attitudinal model.  
Even the early behavioral work that gave birth to the attitudinal model 
envisioned strategies for developing coalitions.  The most sustained analysis of 
strategic decision making by Justices, however, came with Walter Murphy’s 
classic Elements of Judicial Strategy.16  The burden that most public law 
political scientists face is to say much more about Supreme Court decision 
making than did Walter Murphy almost forty years ago.  The title of the book 
describes its contents, and, while there has undoubtedly been change in the 
Court as an institution, not to mention the role of government generally and 
other governmental actors, the book may still be the best single description of 
Court behavior and potential behaviors.  It is full of examples of strategic 
actions and considerations.  He notes both internal strategies and external 
influences.  Strategic accounts of judicial behavior even precede Murphy and 
the early behavioralists.  Though Robert McCloskey’s classic work The 
American Supreme Court17 is not generally seen as a book about strategic 
decision making, he certainly demonstrates it.  Witness his account of Marbury 
vs. Madison.18  McCloskey, of course, depicts a wily and strategic John 
Marshall who is fully aware of, and responds to, external constraints, namely 
Thomas Jefferson.19  McCloskey’s own prescription for the proper role for the 
Supreme Court in the American system involves strategic calculations about 
when the Court should insert itself into difficult issues.  Despite preoccupation 
with the attitudinal model in the journals, strategic understandings have never 
really been abandoned.20  The point of this brief foray into public law 
 
 16. WALTER F. MURPHY, ELEMENTS OF JUDICIAL STRATEGY (1964). 
 17. ROBERT G. MCCLOSKY, THE AMERICAN SUPREME COURT (1960).  This was the only 
work that I was assigned to read in both law school classes and political science classes.  It would 
be interesting to note what literature is routinely assigned today in both places. 
 18. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). 
 19. MCCLOSKY, supra note 17, at 40-44. 
 20. My book Deciding to Decide, though often seen as solely about certiorari, is largely 
about the interplay of attitudes, strategy, and the perceived constraint of the law.  Though the 
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scholarship history is simply to point out that the understanding of strategic 
behavior that Professor Merrill is testing is of one sort.  His understanding is 
gleaned from the work of Lee Epstein and Jack Knight, two scholars who are 
part of this Symposium.  It is certainly a logical place to start.  The 
aforementioned burden of saying anything new after Murphy was met by these 
two scholars.  Their book, The Choices Justices Make,21 pays homage to 
Murphy, but, more importantly, they have refocused attention of public law 
scholars on strategic decision making.  They build on the scholarship of the 
attitudinalists, and they also bring to bear insights from the rational choice 
literature.  Epstein and Knight give us concrete examples, as well as more of a 
theoretical base, of understanding how a strategic decision making process 
might work in the Supreme Court. 
Professor Merrill’s lecture demonstrates problems with using internal and 
external strategic calculations to try to explain too much.  His findings seem 
right.  Strategy is important, but not all important.  Others, however, will be 
less persuaded.  He will be accused of not really testing strategic explanations.  
Unlike the attitudinal model, modern strategic analysis is broad-based within 
the discipline of political science, and it crosses disciplines, including, of 
course, economics and law.  Modeling strategic behavior has become a very 
sophisticated endeavor, and it is much more theoretically driven.  Institutions 
and rules matter, but the theories of decision making are general, and the 
unique aspects of an institution simply must be interpreted to fit the more 
general terms.  In short, challenging a strategic explanation is a more 
formidable task.  I dare say that most rational choice scholars would not see 
Professor Merrill’s counterfactuals as much refutation.  Rational choice 
approaches are, by no means, universally accepted by political scientists.  
Debates about it have been furious and have torn departments and subfields 
asunder.  Professor Merrill’s effort actually goes to the heart of much of the 
debate about rational choice.  Oversimplifying, its critics assert that the 
proponents can assume away any difficulties, particularly in how one defines a 
preference, and so it is difficult ever to disprove empirically.  A related 
criticism is that a model, though mathematically consistent, is so far removed 
from reality that it is no longer helpful.  Again oversimplifying, defenders 
assert that even very sophisticated empirical statistical analysis rarely amounts 
to more than “barefoot empiricism.”  Scientific knowledge must be theory 
driven, otherwise all one has is some interesting correlations that might have 
 
context of the book is largely the certiorari process, it is really an argument about decision 
making by the Justices generally.  In the mix, strategy often plays an important role.  See PERRY, 
supra note 5, at 113-284. 
 21. See LEE EPSTEIN & JACK KNIGHT, THE CHOICES JUSTICES MAKE (1998). 
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some predictive ability.22  Theory, here, basically means the theories of 
economics and the related theories of games and public choice. 
The foregoing remarks are not really a criticism of Professor Merrill’s 
effort.  Indeed, he acknowledges limitations and notes that his purpose is to 
encourage political scientists and those more sophisticated in methods to 
pursue the questions that he has raised.23  Still, taken on its own terms and 
without going to rigorous mathematical modeling, there is one problem that is 
apparent.  Most notably, one cannot just look at the strategy of one player.  
Professor Merrill acknowledges this when he looks at the tit-for-tat scenario, 
and he does talk about the need to look at what other players are doing.  Before 
he can dismiss strategic explanations, however, he must take into account more 
fully the strategy and the responses of other players.  Likewise, one would 
need to examine not only the preference ordering of Justices, but the intensity 
of the preferences.  Interestingly, Professor Merrill does this more than much 
rational choice scholarship, even if he has done it in a more informal way.  A 
strategic analysis would also need to look more at decision options within a set 
of rules.  For example, it would require an analysis of when, how, and who 
could exercise vetoes, at what cost, and in what ways.  One would want to 
understand the extent to which one is engaged in repeat play.  So, for example, 
it may be incorrect to assume that Justice Scalia would prefer to shape a 
majority opinion à la Justice Brennan rather than be a powerful dissenter.  That 
strategic choice may depend upon his time horizon.  In short, to test and refute 
or qualify strategic explanations that would satisfy most political scientists, one 
would need to engage in a slightly more sophisticated analysis, even if not held 
to the standards of those who do rational choice for a living. 
Finally, Professor Merrill’s notion of a Court in stasis or flux is a very 
helpful concept.  In fact, it sits well with all sorts of decision theory.  A 
strategy game is definitely influenced by the ability to identify the preferences 
and strategies of others, and a Court in stasis is going to enable that in ways 
that a Court in flux will not.  In less esoteric terms, some have suggested that 
one of the reasons for the “failed revolution” of the Burger Court was the 
 
 22. Many outside observers have seen the rational choice wars as having been about 
quantitative versus qualitative research.  In fact, the fight was more between empirical statistical 
research versus theory-driven research.  The quantitative vs. qualitative debate has existed since 
the behavioral revolution, but for the most part quantitative research long ago won that battle in 
terms of journal publications and prestige in the profession.  That said, non-quantitative research 
continued to be published, especially in books, and now is actually having some resurgence in the 
journals.  Moreover, the second wave of rational choice scholarship often tries to verify 
empirically its models.  Nevertheless, fighting over methodological approaches is congenital in 
political science departments. 
 23. See Merrill, supra note 1, at 572-73. 
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inability of the conservatives to predict outcomes on the merits.24  They could 
get four votes for certiorari, but often miscalculated for the fifth vote on the 
merits.25  More traditional non-rational choice decision theory also accounts 
for group composition in understanding collegial decision making.  As one 
example, norms of reciprocity develop and evolve. 
Now for my own hobbyhorse.  If we truly want to understand decision 
making behavior by individuals, we might all need to learn more about 
cognitive decision making processes.  We know from cognitive psychologists 
that it is a very complex phenomenon.  Political science undoubtedly could 
learn much from cognitive psychology.  This, however, is the dilemma of all 
academic research.  There is always more that we need to know, and it is 
impossible to keep up with one’s own discipline, let alone others.  That is why 
Professor Merrill’s attempt here is so impressive and why one hopes that 
political scientists will take up his challenge.  Even if they do not, however, 
from his cogent analysis, we have a far better understanding of this Court, and 
we also have a new and better understanding of the problems and possibilities 
of public law political science when trying to explain the behavior of Justices. 
 
 24. VINCENT BLASI, THE BURGER COURT: THE COUNTER-REVOLUTION THAT WASN’T 
(1983). 
 25. PERRY, supra note 5, at 198-212. 
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